Hardly a week passes without some new spat between the Trump administration and Europe

But in a year that has seen a major dispute over tariffs , US President Donald Trump threatening to annex Greenland and disagreements over aid to Ukraine, the most pressing threat facing Europe is the ongoing transatlantic rift over NATO.

Trump has declared that the US will withdraw 5,000 – and probably many more – troops stationed in Germany, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the US handling of the Iran conflict, saying Tehran had humiliated Washington.

Trump also took a swipe at Spain and Italy for not helping the US campaign against Iran. Asked if he would consider withdrawing US troops in those countries, Trump responded: “Probably… look, why shouldn’t I? Italy has not been of any help to us and Spain has been horrible, absolutely horrible.”

Spain has denied the US military permission to use its bases or its airspace for missions or strikes linked to the conflict. Trump’s criticism of Italy comes despite its Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, being a key ally.

Trump has long complained that the US is unfairly shouldering the burden when it comes to western security, once singling out European economic powerhouse Germany as “delinquent” on the issue. The partial US withdrawal is another iteration of this saga - but one that underlines bigger problems.

As US willingness to underpin European security frays – and the Russian threat grows – Germany, the United Kingdom and France are promising to usher in a new era of spending. But they have a mountain to climb, and not very long to do so.

“If we are to remain transatlantic, we must strengthen the European pillar within NATO,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Saturday after Trump spoke of pulling out troops.

Pistorius suggested the drawdown was expected, calling it “foreseeable.”

Thousands of US troops remain in Germany, although levels are a fraction of what they once were.

As of December 2025, 36,436 US active service members were stationed in Germany, according to US Defense Department data. At the height of the Cold War, some 250,000 active-duty troops were based in what was West Germany.

The umbrella has been taken down even though Russia remains a threat – and the latest US move “underscores the need for Europe to invest more in defense,” NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said Saturday.

Washington wants to focus on challenges “where only American power can play a decisive role” in Asia and its own hemisphere, according to a senior Pentagon official, Elbridge Colby . It is demanding “much greater efforts by our allies to step up and assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe,” Colby added.

In the US perspective, he said, “there is nothing anti-European about this vision. To the contrary, it reflects hope and indeed confidence in Europe’s capacity to act substantially and vigorously.”

Some Europeans see it differently – as a loss of solidarity and common purpose - and a striking example of US unilateralism.

“The greatest threat to the transatlantic community is not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Saturday. “We must all do what it takes to reverse this disastrous trend.”

Reversing the trend requires higher defense spending among most NATO members, a resurgence of weapons production, investment in new technologies and deeper collaboration.

On current plans, Europe’s defense annual spending is set to almost double by 2030, reaching nearly $750 billion.

But using that money wisely also demands a different mindset. When it comes to defense, governments jealously guard national preferences, so there has been an historic lack of collaboration in production and procurement.

Smaller production runs mean that equipment like the German Leopard battle tank costs far more than its US counterpart, analysts say. The US produces one main battle tank; Europe makes a dozen.

The collapse of a Franco-German project to build a new generation of jet fighters is an example of irreconcilable national interests. Amid constant bickering over leadership of the project, the CEO of French plane-maker Dassault, Eric Trappier, said of their neighbor: “If they want to do it themselves, let them do it themselves.”

Trump threatens more cuts after US announced withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany

There is another challenge as Europe weans itself off US hardware. The European Union wants at least half of member states’ defense spending to stay inside the EU by 2030.

The rationale is simple: you can’t build up your own capabilities if you are buying off-the-shelf elsewhere. Historically, nearly 80% of purchases have gone outside the zone, mainly to the US.

Managing that transition without creating new vulnerabilities will be a vast challenge, one that is already creating headaches for Europe amid a surge in US consumption of weapons and munitions in the war against Iran, both by its own forces and Gulf allies.

Shortages in missile defense systems are especially acute – an area in which Europe is already weak. Analysts describe a “staggering” burn-rate of missile defense interceptors such as Patriots and THAADs in the Gulf conflict, with the US set to send Gulf allies more such weapons worth several billion dollars.

Notably, in addition to the troop drawdown in Germany, the Pentagon said it would no longer be sending as planned a Long-Range Fires battalion equipped with Tomahawk and hypersonic missiles.

European manufacturers produce varying missile interceptors - but not at scale and especially not those capable of countering ballistic and advanced cruise missiles. They don’t offer “a single, full substitute for U.S. systems,” according to a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

More co-production would mitigate the crunch, but as the CSIS report noted, it “requires a degree of transatlantic trust and prioritization that may no longer exist.”

Therein lies Europe’s dilemma. The fast track towards rearmament runs through the US but requires mutual trust and consistency.

The slower track requires Europe to spend more, overcome a fragmented industrial structure, and try to factor in whether Washington’s priorities today are a passing phase or a new order.

There are signs of progress, with the United Kingdom closely involved in building a European defense identity despite Brexit, and a growing raft of joint projects between defense companies and Ukraine.

Companies like Saab in Sweden, Germany’s Rheinmetall and BAE in the UK are sitting on record order books.

Sweden and Finland, which recently joined NATO, have rapidly integrated into the alliance.

But pooling sovereignty to accelerate Europe’s ability to defend itself remains the holy grail.